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Reeves / RHETORIC
SCIENCE
COMMUNICATION
AND THE SCIENCE OF PRIONS
A significant theoretical shift in the research community examining a class of terminal, infectious neurological disorders that includes Mad Cow Disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and
Kuru was assisted by rhetorical production. The local rhetoric of one laboratory, that of Professor Stanley B. Prusiner, involved first situating an heretical hypothesis within the framework of
the orthodox narrative and then audaciously promoting that heresy. Another aspect of rhetorical
production in this case involved situating a new language associated with the heretical
hypothesis. To promote their new lexicon, the Prusiner team evoked orthodox values of consistency, efficiency, and collective ratification. Eventually, what was once heresy became dogma;
what was once a lexicon employed by a minority in the field was adopted by the majority.

An Orthodox Heresy
Scientific Rhetoric and the Science of Prions

CAROL REEVES
Butler University

The saga of prions truly represents the triumph of scientific investigation over
prejudice.
—Stanley B. Prusiner (1999, 14)
Prion biology and diseases is stimulating in ways probably not anticipated by
its authors. It leads one to re-examine the objectivity of science and whether it
is a myth vanished. It underscores the stunning force of the declarative sentence and, although I hate to admit it, the peculiarly American sport of betting
on popular momentum.
—Laura Manuelidis (2000, 2083)

The research community examining a class of terminal, infectious neurological disorders that includes Mad Cow Disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease,
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and Kuru has experienced an extraordinary theoretical shift in the past twenty
years. According to the 1997 Nobel Prize Committee, this transformation
was largely due to the efforts of one man: Stanley B. Prusiner, the recipient of
the 1997 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine. For Prusiner and those who
agree with him, scientific investigation triumphed over prejudice and dogma,
as Prusiner’s quotation above indicates. For others, such as Laura
Manuelidis, quoted above, Prusiner’s triumph is largely the result of rhetorical and linguistic moves such as the declarative sentence and popular
momentum.
Stanley B. Prusiner proposed in April 1982 (in Science) a protein-only
hypothesis to explain causation in scrapie, a neurodegenerative disease in
sheep. The causative agent, he proposed, is a ubiquitous mammalian protein
that either spontaneously or through genetic mutation becomes an errant particle—which he named “prion”—capable of replicating itself and infecting
surrounding tissue. Because Prusiner has promoted protein as the major
molecular component of his prion and because he emphasized evidence of no
nucleic acid, his hypothesis could be said to defy the central dogma of modern microbiology—that DNA or RNA must be present for life forms to replicate.1 Previous investigators had proposed non–nucleic acid hypotheses in
the 1960s. Tikvah Alper, a radiobiologist, and I. H. Pattison, a veterinary biologist, both demonstrated anomalous characteristics of the scrapie agent
(Poulsen and Andersen 2001). Theoretical chemist and biophysicist J. S.
Griffith (1967) proposed in Nature that the scrapie agent lacked nucleic acid
and that replication was achieved either by a protein acting as an inducer or by
the polymerizing of different conformations of a protein. Griffith’s proposal
did not stimulate any significant reconsideration of the generally accepted
viral theory of disease causation (Poulsen and Andersen 2001). Prusiner was
the first to bring dramatic attention to the idea of a protein-only agency.
Laura Manuelidis’s (2000) claim that Prusiner’s success has been largely
due to his use of language begs for serious investigation by scholars of scientific communication. Her contention that Prusiner’s rise to prominence was a
result of the declarative sentence raises several important questions that this
article will address: if Prusiner’s original hypothesis that a protein particle
without nucleic acid can infect host tissue and self-replicate was a heresy,
how did he encourage his audience to take it seriously? How did Prusiner
introduce, justify, and promote his new lexicon? Finally, is there any evidence that Prusiner’s success was largely the result of his rhetoric, as
Manuelidis claims? As I will demonstrate in this article, Stanley Prusiner
employs clearly strategic rhetorical moves that situate his heresy within
orthodox or conservative scientific values. He also promotes universal usage
of his new terminology with moves that create the aura of collective
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agreement and terministic efficiency. That Prusiner’s influence is traceable to
rhetoric is at least as arguable as the claim that his influence was the result of
“the triumph of scientific investigation over prejudice” (Prusiner 1999).
Prusiner inspired excitement—and popular momentum—surrounding his
prion hypothesis even as the definitive evidence supporting it lagged behind
its growing communal endorsement. And Prusiner’s new terminology caught
on even as other scientists proposed their own terms for the causative agent in
these diseases. This eventual domination of the prion lexicon is traceable to
particular rhetorical moves made by Prusiner and his cowriters.
One focus of this article is, naturally, on discourse. The prion lexicon, currently the preferred usage to describe the disease agent (the “prion”) and the
classification of diseases (“prion diseases”), has helped to solidify the
research community around a particular perception of a phenomenon: in this
case, the perception of protein. This prion discourse, as “the common structure that carves up and articulates what is seen and what is said” (Foucault
1994, xix), was founded on one signifier—the “prion.” The signifier, “prion,”
stands for a signified—the agent causing scrapie and other similar
neurodegenerative diseases—whose exact nature continues to be debated
(see Chesebro 1998; Manuelidis 2000). We have a situation, not wholly
unprecedented in science, especially in the world of subatomic particles (see
Hacking 1983, 82-84), in which the signifier is more “real” than the signified.
As Hacking (1983) explained, “the language game of naming hypothetical entities can occasionally work well even if no real thing is being named”
(p. 87). Similarly, Foucault (1994) described the signifier as having the
potential to replace the signified, so that it “begin[s] to speak of itself” and in
translating the supposed reality of the signified, “the signifier is not supposed
to ‘translate’ without concealing, without leaving the signified with an inexhaustible reserve; the signified is revealed only in the visible, heavy world of
a signifier” (p. xvi). That “inexhaustible reserve” of the disease agent could
include a nucleic acid as Manuelidis and other scientists contend. This “visible, heavy world of a signifier,” of the discourse of prions, can be traced back
to a single agent, Stanley Prusiner, and to local rhetorical acts that contributed
to epistemic and discursive transformation.
The arbitrary nature of reference in science leads rhetorical scholars of
science such as Gross (1990) to insist that what counts as scientific knowledge is less an agreement about real objects than an agreement about statements about objects; knowledge is “a consensus concerning the coherence of a
range of utterances, rather than the fit between the facts and reality” (p. 204).
Agreement is the result of rhetorical production of concepts and objects.
Thus, local rhetorical acts, such as the scientific papers produced by
Prusiner’s laboratory, utter statements that describe versions of reality, that
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contain terms that conceal as well as reveal, and that help to initiate a conceptual change in the community’s thinking about the subject at hand.
When we examine local rhetorical acts in science, we are mainly examining emphasis. What elements of the subject or phenomenon—what terms,
perceptions, orientations, indications, implications—are emphasized and
diminished through the strategic use of the available persuasive strategies in
scientific communication? How is presence, that is, what is most present or
most openly displayed to readers (see Gross 1990, 42), constructed? For
Gross (1990), presence “becomes a special case of perception” that is “easily
subject to manipulation” (p. 42). While visual perception, which Gross
points out has been persuasive in evolutionary biology, does not play a role in
this analysis, other aspects of manipulated perceptions become very important. Titles that boldly announce theories as facts, declarative statements
about the reality of phenomena whose existence and characterization are
under dispute, and speculative statements emphasizing productivity over
plausibility are all examples of the clear intent that I have discovered in
Prusiner’s rhetoric to manipulate readers’ perceptions. In the case of a scientist’s promotion of a claim that his audience will likely consider heretical,
rhetorical presence becomes even more crucial since, as Wolpe (1994)
explained, a heresy is rarely presented as an overtly alien idea. Heretics
attempt to bridge ideological gaps between the orthodox view and their
own by connecting their view “to existing constructs within the discourse”
(pp. 1135-36). The heretic employs the language of the orthodoxy,
“draw[ing] from the discourse’s own history,” selecting and emphasizing
marginal linguistic constructs, and elevating them into important positions
(p. 1135). Prusiner emphasizes less prominent though nonetheless orthodox
values to situate his heresy within an orthodox framework while he emphasizes mainstream values in promoting his new terminology.
I will begin discussion of the local rhetorical acts that I argue helped promote a claim once considered heretical and a terminological shift that eventually solidified into the prion discourse.

Science, 1982: The Dramatic and
the Implausible: Baptizing the
Protein-Only Hypothesis
The local rhetorical act that launched the protein-only hypothesis and the
prion lexicon was Prusiner’s review essay on scrapie in the 9 April 1982
issue of Science. A review essay is normally not the forum for making bold
claims and offering new terminology. “A ‘review paper’ is not an original
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publication,” admonishes Robert Day (1979, 96) in How to Write and Publish a Scientific Paper. Prusiner’s insistence on making an original claim rankled his original coauthor, Frank Masiarz, who finally refused to continue
work on the article. Masiarz (cited in Taubes 1986) told a journalist:
I wanted it to be a very critical overview in terms of the possibilities for the
structure of the agent. By creating the name prion, he clearly wanted to push the
entire interpretation in the direction of a protein-only agent. I said there’s no
point in creating a name for something that we don’t even know exits yet. (P. 36)

With his colleague critical of his aggressive rhetorical agenda and his audience likely unreceptive to the idea of a protein-only agent, Prusiner plunged
ahead, manipulating the review article to do his bidding. Facing likely resistance, Prusiner had to avoid alienating his audience while preparing them to
consider either a new framework or an alternative that could coexist with current thinking. Dale Sullivan (1996) suggested that whether audiences view a
claim as destructive heresy or plausible novelty depends on how successful
the writer is in “displaying disciplinarity,” or the orthodox values of the field.
As Sullivan asserted, “a strong orthodox ethos enables the rhetor to make
innovative claims and to gain a serious hearing for those claims. Being orthodox allows one to be audacious” (p. 226). Prusiner is, indeed, audacious, but
his audacity is tempered by his emphasis of certain orthodox values, which
allows him to assert his claim as a productive novelty rather than as a destructive heresy. Kuhn (1977) proposed that “very often the successful scientist
must simultaneously display the characteristics of the traditionalist and of the
iconoclast” (p. 227). This is Prusiner’s crowning success.
He began the article (Prusiner 1982) with the conventional literature
review summarizing disciplinary knowledge, never hinting at what he eventually would propose later in the article. Each section describes separate studies of what he called “the scrapie agent,” beginning with a scrupulous review
of the knowledge base followed by the litany of hypotheses about the scrapie
agent’s chemical structure. The litany establishes a rhetorical exigency that
helps demonstrate a need for new ideas (see Prelli 1989, 22-23). Prusiner
directed readers’ perceptions of an intellectual stasis in the field, a general
disorder requiring a synthesizing and exciting hypothesis to generate some
useful direction. Following the literature review, Prusiner twisted the conventional review into a forum for considering heresy.
Prusiner (1982) built the case for a proteinaceous agency by first emphasizing evidence from his own and other laboratories’ studies that suggests
that a protein is required for either infection or the agent itself. He then
emphasized his own evidence showing that measures normally deactivating
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DNA do not deactivate the agent in scrapie. He concluded that “the foregoing
summary of experimental data indicates that the molecular properties of the
scrapie agent differ from that of viruses, viroids, and plasmids” (p. 141). This
would not strike any reader as particularly noteworthy since the scrapie agent
had long been considered unusual. But Prusiner made a leap from common
knowledge of unusual molecular properties—which do not rule out nucleic
acid—to proposing a name that emphasizes one particular molecular property: protein. The signifier, “prion,” thus highlights protein while it conceals
other properties of the agent, thereby helping to direct readers’ perceptions.
Prusiner wrote, “In place of such terms as ‘unconventional virus’ or ‘unusual
slow virus-like agent,’ the term ‘prion’ (pronounced pree-on) is suggested.
Prions are proteinaceous infectious particles, which are resistant to inactivation by most procedures that modify nucleic acids” (p. 141).
Prusiner (1982) was employing Prelli’s (1989) second form of linguistic
inducement: “discourse will draw attention to a particular kind of description . . . and deflect attention away from (though not necessarily deny) alternative ways of looking” (p. 99). We also have the baptism of a term whose referent has not been structurally identified. By providing a referent that
replaces the neutral term “agent” as well as the theory-focused term “virus,”
Prusiner planted the idea of protein into the discourse he hoped would be
employed by others and initiated a grand move toward shifting the field’s
attention away from viruses. Yet naming something before consensus has
been reached about its existence can seem presumptuous, even disingenuous.
Masiarz’s (cited in Taubes 1986) comment above indicates a tacit assumption
regarding interpretation, brought to the surface by Prusiner’s violation.
In the final section of the article, Prusiner (1982) proposed two possible
models for the agent, one conventional, one unconventional. He brought to
bear all the available means to persuade his audience that the unconventional
model is, if not entirely plausible and even if heretical, a more exciting idea
with greater potential for fruitfulness. Wolpe (1994) insisted that the heretic
is “selectively emphasizing linguistic constructs that are secondary, minor or
background themes, and which are marginal under the reigning orthodoxy,
and elevating them to [a] position of primary importance” (p. 1135). Plausibility, that is, the extent to which an explanation fits both evidence and current
knowledge and theory, is a primary orthodox concern since it is in the interest
of orthodoxy to have explanations that fit within its framework. The potential
for fruitfulness, used as an argumentative resource backing a hypothesis, can
satisfy orthodox thinking only if the condition for plausibility has been met.
Yet Prusiner emphasized the potential for fruitfulness without meeting the
conditions for plausibility, as he admitted later in the article.
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He (Prusiner 1982) began by describing two models suggested by the data
he had presented earlier: the data suggest “two possible models for the scrapie agent: (i) a small nucleic acid surrounded by a tightly packed protein coat
or (ii) a protein devoid of nucleic acid, that is, an infectious protein” (p. 141).
The first model, he conceded, is “most plausible,” yet, “there is no evidence
for a nucleic acid within the agent” (p. 141). However, the “most plausible”
interpretation may not be the most interesting or offer the greatest research
potential, as he argued in the rest of the paper. The second possibility, he carefully admitted, is “clearly heretical. Skepticism of the second model is certainly justified. Only purification of the scrapie agent to homogeneity and
determination of its chemical structure will allow a rigorous conclusion as to
which of these two models is correct” (p. 142).
After conceding that more rigor is needed and admitting that skepticism
is justified, Prusiner (1982), the iconoclast, built a case for considering his
“clearly heretical” possibility. Without an a priori context within which a
protein-only hypothesis makes sense, Prusiner attempted to create a textual
one in which his readers use their imaginations and join him in fruitful
heresy:
If prions do not contain a nucleic acid genome, then studies on the replication
of prions may reveal unprecedented mechanisms of reproduction. (P. 142)
The consequences of understanding the structure, function, and replication of
prions are significant. (P. 143)
A knowledge of the molecular structure of prions may help identify the etiologies of some chronic degenerative diseases in humans. . . . Diseases where
prions might play an etiological role include Alzheimer’s senile dementia,
multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, diabetes
mellitus, rheumatoid arthritis, and lupus erythematosus, as well as a variety of
neoplastic disorders. (P. 143)

Heresy is thus linked to the promise of new discovery and knowledge rather
than “rigorous conclusions.” Prusiner exploited the convention of ending a
paper with “the strongest claim in the study” (Swales 1990, 172) to emphasize the weakest, most tentative claim. This article, with its unusual blending
of conservative and iconoclastic rhetorical moves, essentially asks its audience to believe rather than doubt.
Prusiner’s ideas created considerable publicity, first in the lay press, then
in the scientific press. The New York Times, with the drama and aplomb typical of popular accounts of science,2 reported that “a group of scientists in San
Francisco have reported evidence suggesting the existence of an infectious
organism with characteristics unlike any organism known” (Altman 1982,
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A10). A year later, the Times reported that “the prion, the smallest infectious
agent known, appears to have links to Alzheimer’s disease and several other
degenerative disorders of the brain” (Altman 1983, A22). Clearly, the term
“prion” had infected the popular press.
Some science writers remained more skeptical. Gary Taubes began his
1986 Discover profile of the University of San Francisco neurologist:
Naming something before you discover it is risky business. For starters, you
have to couch your definition with great care, so that it will fit whatever it is that
you find, when and if you actually find it. In public, you have to deal confidently with your fellow scientists, who are likely to take umbrage at your
nomenclatorial presumption. (P. 28)

Taubes quoted Prusiner’s justification of the new term:
Prion is a terrific word. It’s snappy. It’s easy to pronounce. People like it. It isn’t
easy to come up with a good word in biology. One hell of a lot of bad words
people introduce get thrown away. (P. 28)

Despite Prusiner’s defense of his new term, Taubes rendered the prion story
as one in which the bad guys manipulate discourse, promote heresies, and
turn a small, esoteric basic research field into “a big-money, high-profile
enterprise” (p. 30). The good guys, the traditionalists, are left in the dust,
forced to jump on the bandwagon or get left out of the funding loop.
First reactions from scientists to Prusiner’s protein-only hypothesis indicate the extent to which Prusiner had challenged the orthodoxy—its methods
and its rhetoric. Critics claimed that the protein-only hypothesis was merely
“the racier scenario” (cited in Taubes 1986, 41) and that Prusiner was
“jump[ing] to conclusions,” as Taubes (1986, 36) quoted one critic. Attacks
were also leveled at his rhetoric, or what Taubes called “a flair for public relations” (p. 30). Paul Bendheim, quoted in Taubes, complained that Prusiner
“rammed that word [“prion”] down the throats of everybody in that laboratory and in the world” (p. 33). Others accused him of exploiting language to
attract attention and research funding rather than do careful, conservative science. As Taubes wrote, Prusiner’s critics
suggested that his heresy wasn’t in his prion, but in his premature claim that
such a bizarre creature was needed to explain slow virus diseases. Since then,
they’ve only grown more incredulous in the face of Prusiner’s apparent tour de
force. (P. 30)

In articulating the protein-only hypothesis and attempting terminological
change, Prusiner forced to the surface previously tacit assumptions about
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what ought to be considered a knowledge product, what ought to be said
about these products, and when was the appropriate time and place to say
them. Wolpe (1994) insisted that “when two elite scientists dispute a theory,
the rules of evidence and scholarly rhetoric are clear. When a heretic enters
the fray, it is the rules themselves that are under attack” (p. 1137). “The ultimate threat to orthodox discourse,” Wolpe claimed, “is that the heretical ideology may take over as the new, taken for granted basis of the profession’s
conceptualization of the world” (p. 1138). In a review and critique of
Prusiner’s hypothesis and data, Richard H. Kimberlin (1982) defended
orthodox values, pleading for caution, simplicity, and thoroughness. His
charge that Prusiner has gone too far “outside the current framework of
molecular biology to accommodate the scrapie agent” (p. 108) represents an
appeal to the topos of external consistency, the expectation that any new
explanation be externally consistent with views shared by members of a field
(see Prelli 1989, 132-33, 201). Prusiner’s lines of evidence, Kimberlin
argued, pointing to a lack of nucleic acid in the agent “are not by themselves
compelling reasons for considering highly unorthodox models of scrapie
agent” (p. 108). He offered “a much simpler working hypothesis which fits
both established facts and even Prusiner’s recent data” (p. 108), which is that
the agent does contain a nucleic acid that is not translated; this acid could be
very small and still be able to replicate, and disease could “be a consequence
of the binding of the scrapie-specific nucleic acid to host protein needed to
form an infectious agent” (p. 108). Taking issue with Prusiner’s term “prion,”
Kimberlin insisted that “virino” is preferable to “prion” “because the later
emphasizes a molecular species which may not be the most important one,
as did the conclusion in 1935 that tobacco mosaic virus was proteinaceous”
(p. 108). Mainly, Kimberlin emphasized that “we do not yet need to build
hypotheses outside the current framework of molecular biology to accommodate the scrapie agent. The real need is to assemble more hard facts” (p. 108),
thus reminding the field of its traditional values of patience and caution.
Prelli (1989) aptly described such an attack from the orthodoxy: “when
defenders of scientific orthodoxy directly and publicly challenge the scientific ethos of radical or unconventional claim-makers, topoi like universality,
communality, skepticism, and disinterestedness are likely to figure prominently in argumentative attacks” (p. 108).

Promoting the Prion Lexicon
Despite Kimberlin’s (1982) attack, Prusiner persisted in his attempts to
change the discourse in an armada of papers from his laboratory throughout
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the eighties. This campaign involved directing readers’ perceptions of the
new terminology as justified by collective agreement and the need for terminological consistency and efficiency, all orthodox concerns.
One strategy employed by the Prusiner group is the use of the term
“prion,” as if it referred to an entity whose characterization had already been
ratified and documented by collective experience. This ratification had not
occurred, as one editorialist explained in the Lancet (Scrapie 1982). While
Prusiner’s group had demonstrated that a protein was necessary for infection,
whether a protein was “structurally integrated with the scrapie genome, or
only in adventitious association with it, is not known” (Scrapie 1982, 1222).
That is, there was no consensus about whether the protein was the main structural component of the prion particle or whether it was adhering to another
structure, like a virus. To employ the term “prion” as “proteinaceous infectious particle” when there was no collective agreement about the importance
of that protein in the structure of this particle was to promote ratification of
the new term before ratification of the theory of disease causation it
represented.
During the early eighties, Prusiner’s laboratory papers regularly included
statements about prions that create the impression of a documented and characterized object. The following statement, for example, appears in mostly the
same form in several early articles: “the properties of the scrapie agent distinguish it from both viroids and viruses and have prompted the introduction of
the term ‘prion’to denote a small proteinaceous infectious particle that resists
inactivation by procedures that modify nucleic acids” (Baringer, Bowman,
and Prusiner 1983; Diener, McKinley, and Prusiner 1982; McKinley, Bolton,
and Prusiner 1983). With numerous researchers still looking for a viral agent,
the phrase “the properties of the scrapie agent” implies that everyone already
knows what these properties are and agrees that they distinguish prions from
viruses and, finally, that everyone agrees about the new term. Such statements ring with authority and collective experience, especially the declarative passive “have prompted the introduction of the term ‘prion,’ ” which
allows the authors to promote the new term without seeming to do so. Material reality, not human ambition, has prompted new terms. The above statement also appeals to the topos of “significant anomaly,” which Prelli (1989)
explained is employed to establish that “there is a need for radical reconstruction of currently accepted scientific paradigms” (p. 130). The “unusual”
properties of the scrapie agent justify a new term and “radical reconstruction”
of how this agent is viewed and studied. But since the name change is based
on operations of the agent—what it does—and not on its structural characteristics, Prusiner was elevating a less important orthodox consideration—what
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the agent does—over what most of his colleagues would care about most—
what the agent is, its thorough characterization.
Titles of papers from the Prusiner laboratory emphasize the fact-like status of the prion and imply community agreement. The titles below are
examples:
“A Protease-Resistant Protein Is a Structural Component of the Scrapie Prion”
(McKinley, Bolton, and Prusiner 1983)
“Scrapie Prions Aggregate to Form Amyloid-like Birefringent Rods” (Prusiner
et al. 1983)
“Prions” (Prusiner 1984a)

Another tactic in raising prions to fact status involved linking them to
well-established phenomena. The linguistic linkage suggests that knowledge
of prions is equally as definitive as that surrounding the linked entity:
The similarities raise the question whether or not other retinal degenerative diseases might be caused by infectious agents such as prions or slow viruses.
(Hogan et al. 1983, 708)
Scrapie is a degenerative, neurological disorder caused by a slow infectious
agent or prion. (Prusiner et al. 1984, 127)
It is well established that Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is caused by a slow
infectious agent similar to the scrapie prion. . . . The similarities in the regional
metabolic alterations between CJD and AD [Alzheimer’s disease] provide
additional evidence for the possibility that AD may be caused by a slow infectious prion. (Friedland et al. 1984, 978, emphasis added)

Despite statements like these in several articles, Prusiner admitted in a 1984
book chapter that the agent causing scrapie and other diseases is not documented or well understood; he conceded that the term “prion” “must remain
operational until its entire structure is known. . . . At present, we still do not
know if the prion contains a nucleic acid” (Prusiner 1984b, 4). If the term is
merely operational, if its structure is not entirely characterized, and if nucleic
acid has not been entirely ruled out, then how can this agent be so definitively
distinguished from viruses or viroids? Even if shown to be similar to the
agent causing Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, why must the agent’s proteinaceous
quality be emphasized over other, as yet undetected, qualities? Again, what
appears to be a statement about material reality is actually a tool in the materialization of an idea, the idea of an infectious protein particle. Latour and
Woolgar (1986) suggested:
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if facts are constructed through operations designed to effect the dropping of
modalities which qualify a given statement, and, more importantly, if reality is
the consequence rather than the cause of this construction, this means that a scientist’s activity is directed, not toward “reality,” but toward these operations on
statements. (P. 237)

Fact status statements thus may become resources for gaining adherence during a time of competing claims (see Reeves 1997, 1998). Prusiner’s main
competition was a group of scientists who had discovered the same particles
but who did not go as far as Prusiner in formulating a theory of disease causation. This group (Merz et al. 1983), which first published its findings in 1983,
called the particle “Scrapie-Associated Fibril, SAF.”

Encouraging Universal Usage
Prusiner also helped encourage universal usage of his term “prion” by giving it both generic and specific meanings. He replaced terms such as “agent”
or “slow virus”; the term “prion” is a simple but, according to Prusiner, more
specific or more appropriate renaming of the particles collected from the diseased brain. In this usage, the prion is specifically a protein-only agent, thus
carrying the heretical hypothesis. But a broader, generic usage appears as
well, as in the statement, “The scrapie agent is prototypic of a novel class of
small infectious pathogens called prions” (Prusiner et al. 1982, 6942, emphasis added). Here, the term “prion” incorporates a broader meaning, as the
name for a class of infectious agents, thus carrying a less theory-specific
meaning and increasing its usage. As both specific and generic, the term
could be employed by different users, those who thought “protein-only”
when they used the term and those who were thinking “small infectious
pathogens”—such as a virus or viroid—and both sets of users could promote
the term.
A few scientists criticized what they saw as a vague, meaningless term.
Richard Carp and his colleagues insisted in a 1985 review article that “the
term prion fails to provide criteria that distinguish the scrapie agent from most
other infectious agents . . . all of which, of course contain protein” (p. 1362).
They also pointed out that the term is misleading. The most recent definition
Prusiner had provided for the term “prion” in such journals as Scientific
American (Prusiner 1984a) and Advances in Virus Research (Prusiner 1984b)
allowed for the possibility of both a protein without DNA and a protein containing a small nucleic acid within its interior. Carp et al. (1985) viewed
Prusiner’s attempt to promote his ideas through language, by combining an
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unorthodox hypothesis with its more orthodoxy-accommodating alternate
within one term, as a deterrent to productive dialogue:
The term prion can contribute to the current discourse on the nature of the agent
only if its meaning is restricted to the “protein only” possibility. Proponents of
the term strongly imply that the scrapie agent is likely to contain only protein.
However, the presence of nucleic acid is usually mentioned as a possibility.
The attempt to subsume within the single term, prion, both the “protein only”
and the “protein with nucleic acid” concepts, has made it difficult to engage in
precise dialogue about the term. (P. 1362)

Precisely! The term is both specific and generic, serving the synthesis of
heresy and orthodoxy in Prusiner’s rhetorical project. The term has something to offer everyone, those who use the term to refer to a specific type of
particle that contains no nucleic acid as well as those who use the term to signify any infectious particle that contains protein. Both groups of users unwittingly promoted usage.

Creating an Aura of Inevitability
Prusiner continues to reconcile his terminological coup with orthodox
principles so that his terms seem inevitably appropriate. In several review
articles published in the mid-eighties, Prusiner first conceded to the orthodoxy by admitting that his terms are operational only and that the structure of
the prion is still unknown. Yet he went on to use the term as if it reflects a
material reality and justified its usage by explaining that his interest is in efficiency—“for ease of discussion.”
I will discuss one article published in Advances in Virus Research
(Prusiner 1984b) in some detail. Prusiner again left a strong impression of
consensus regarding the existence of prions and their role in scrapie. In statements such as the following, he mentioned other transmissible neurological
diseases but admitted that more evidence is needed to link them to prions:
The slow infectious agents causing transmissible mink encephalopathy
(TME), chronic wasting disease (CWD), kuru, CJD, and GSS [GerstmannSträussler Syndrome] are not well characterized; thus, further knowledge
about the properties of these infectious agents must be obtained before they can
be firmly classified as prions. (P. 5)

He uses the term “prion” as a classification thoroughly embedded in disciplinary knowledge and places the burden of proof on anyone who wishes to

Reeves / RHETORIC AND THE SCIENCE OF PRIONS

111

connect other diseases to the prion classification rather than suggest that
more proof for the prion classification is needed. This statement could be
interpreted as an appeal to the topos of external consistency—a move that
establishes the extent to which an explanation is consistent with external or
prevailing opinion (see Prelli 1989, 201). Yet the prion is not the phenomenon
requiring proof of its connection to prevailing opinion in this construction. It
is the prevailing opinion!
Along this same lines, Prusiner (1984b) included a table listing these diseases with the heading “Prion Diseases.” He explained this label by saying,
“For ease of discussion, all the diseases listed in Table 2 are referred to as
prion diseases even though a prion etiology must be considered tentative until
the molecular properties of each slow infectious agent are well defined” (p. 5).
Also in this table, traditional terms for these diseases as a class are listed in
very small type as alternative terms: “alternative terminologies include subacute transmissible spongiform encephalopathies and unconventional slow
virus diseases” (p. 5). To list the terms used by the majority of researchers in
the field is to defer to community usage, but he never uses the terms anywhere
else in his article, listing them here in such small type as to diminish their
importance.
Finally, the table also includes the following statement: “prions have been
shown to cause scrapie and CJD; they are presumed to cause the other diseases listed” (Prusiner 1984b, 5). This statement neatly packs two important
rhetorical moves. First, the statement could be read as uncontroversial as
long as “prion” represents “slow infectious agent” in these diseases. But if
“prion” stands for “proteinaceous infectious agent,” the statement implies
the protein-only hypothesis. Located in the charts where data are presented,
these statements contribute to the aura of inevitability surrounding Prusiner’s
terminology and ideas.
After conceding to the tentative nature of the prion etiology, Prusiner
(1984b) discussed the prion and prion diseases as if their existence in the
community were not at all tentative:
All the Prion diseases share many features. (P. 6)
Certainly, sporadic CJD could be explained by prions being ubiquitous in our
food chain with their efficiency of infections being very low. (P. 8)
The genetic origin of prions and the slow amplification mechanisms which
account for their replication make these unique macromolecules interesting
candidates to explore with respect to many diseases that occur later in life.
(P. 44)
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Again, as with the 1982 review essay in Science discussed above, Prusiner
emphasizes the potential for explaining the mysteries of the disease, a potential linked to a key term—“the prion.”
Another illustration of Prusiner’s concern with creating an impression of
inevitability surrounding the prion occurs in a more popularized account in a
1984 Scientific American article (Prusiner 1984a). In the following quotation, we see both the aura of certainty and the careful diffusion of the heretical
aspects of his hypothesis:
it now appears that an infectious agent named a prion may stand out as an
exception to the rule that every organism carries nucleic acids defining its own
identity. The prion is known to be capable of initiating the production of new
prions. . . . Moreover, among the molecular components of the prion there is at
least one protein, and so one would expect to find a DNA or RNA template
specifying the structure of the protein. The evidence gathered so far however,
indicates the prion has no nucleic acid at all. Even if some DNA or RNA is ultimately found in the prion, there is probably not enough to encode the structure
of the protein. From these facts it does not necessarily follow that the prion violates the central dogma—the latest results favor less heretical hypotheses—but
there is little question its mode of reproduction is highly unusual. (Prusiner,
cited in Keyes 1999b, 191)4

Here Prusiner proposed several models of prion reproduction, including possible mechanisms of replication that did not violate the central dogma.
Prusiner (cited in Keyes 1999b) also explicitly stated what biologists would
agree to be the correct definition of the central dogma: “the principle that
genetic information invariably flows from nucleic acids to proteins is called
the central dogma of molecular biology” (p. 191). As Keyes (1999b)
observed, “the appearance of Crick’s definition of the Central Dogma—in
the very literature concerned with a possible exception to it—was not as common as one might think” (p. 191). While Keyes did not speculate about the
reasons why Prusiner would include such a statement, I would argue that it
served to establish an orthodox ethos and to reconcile the highly unusual
prion with orthodox views and thereby universalize both the prion hypothesis
and the associated lexicon.
A final rhetorical choice that may have stimulated universal usage of
prion-related terms is to link all subsequently discovered phenomena associated with spongiform encephalopathies to the prion. Thus, the protein associated with infection is called prion protein, PrP, and the host gene that codes
for the protein is called the prion protein gene. Competing terms had been
introduced such as “scrapie-associated fibrils” (Merz et al. 1983), which
eventually became rather cumbersome descriptors employed by Prusiner’s
detractors: “scrapie-associated fibril protein” and “scrapie-associated fibril
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protein gene.” Without agreeing with the original prion protein hypothesis,
researchers interested in the host protein or in the genetics of the disease
could use the less awkward prion lexicon. Here is the linguistic momentum
Professor Manuelidis (2000) identified as a key factor in the eventual acceptance of the prion hypothesis.

Influence
Did the Prusiner group’s rhetoric of heresy and aggressive promotion of
the prion lexicon influence a gradual acceptance of the terminology and the
prion hypothesis? Though empirical proof is beyond the range of this article,
there is evidence that rhetorical production of new terms containing a theoretical residue did lead to discursive dominion for prionic terms and did accommodate an epistemic transition in the field. The following lines of evidence
are suggestive:
1. Individual scientists, citing Prusiner’s (1982) Science article, proclaimed
agreement with the prion hypothesis in the eighties and employ the prion
hypothesis as a new way to approach other disease processes such as AIDS
(Kelly 1984; Root-Bernstein 1983). The idea of an infectious protein clearly
stimulated applications to other intractable problems.
2. Medline Database research shows a gradual increase in usage of prionassociated terms even as evidence for the prion hypothesis had not materialized and even when competing terminologies existed.
3. Scientists I have interviewed testify that the acceptance of the prion language
resulted from repetition, momentum, and users’ confusion about terminology.
Increasing usage helped promote universal usage and gradual agreement with
the prion theory, an agreement that discouraged efforts to search for nucleic
acid in the agent or confront the emerging dogma.

Epistemic Impact
Prusiner’s prion hypothesis stimulated new approaches to studying disease processes even as the prion particle remained uncharacterized and its
replication uncharted. A number of articles throughout the eighties signal
agreement with the protein-only theory, emphasizing the productivity and
possibility of the prion theory over empirical concerns. In 1984, Kelly (Medical Hypotheses) proposed that “AIDS could be caused by a mutant hepatitis B
virus or even a prion-like agent” (p. 347), yet he included no explanation of
what “prion-like” is, leaving the impression that, as Latour and Woolgar
(1986) explained, the author is “so persuaded of the existence of facts that no
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explicit reference is made to them” (p. 76). Schwarz (1988) proposed a treatment for spongiform encephalopathies that would inhibit protein synthesis.
He began his article with the statement, “The transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies are probably caused by infectious proteinaceous agents
called prions” (p. 189), yet he did not include the available evidence for that
claim anywhere in his article, leaving the impression of a sufficiently demonstrated causal claim.
In a review of what they call “Prion Science,” Brunori, Silvestrini, and
Pocchiari (1988) concluded that although “this challenging hypothesis is
viewed with skepticism by some authors, . . . the prion hypothesis has aroused
tremendous interest and studies over the last years have [sic] produced new
and unexpected results” (p. 309). They readily admitted that there is no clear
explanation of how the pathological form of the prion protein becomes infectious and that conformational modes are “as yet hypothetical” (p. 312). They
also conceded that “the results obtained on the biochemistry and molecular
genetics of prions have not yet explained the role of PrP [prion protein] in the
onset of the disease” (p. 312). However, they readily promote the idea of an
infectious protein as productive, possibly helping “to clarify the unknown
pathenogenesis of Alzheimer’s disease, which adds further interest to the
molecular studies on the nature of the scrapie agent” (p. 313). They are
clearly infected with the promise of possible fruitfulness embedded in the
promises of Prusiner’s rhetoric.
The Nobel Committee’s praise also emphasizes the impact of ideas over
facts. One committee member, Ralf Pettersson (cited in Vogel 1997), said
that “the details [of the prion hypothesis] have to be solved in the future. But
no one can object to the essential role of the prion protein in these brain diseases” (p. 215). Peter Lansbury (cited in Vogel 1997), a biochemist at
Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston called Prusiner “a trailblazer”
who has “captured the imagination of a huge segment of the scientific population” by taking “a medical and biophysical mystery and chang[ing] it into a
biophysical and biochemical issue with a very original idea. And that’s fabulous” (p. 215). This praise hints that Prusiner’s greatest accomplishment is
not so much laboratory work as a promising and productive idea.

Discursive Infection and Popular Momentum
The prion lexicon gradually dominated the community. In 1990, Michel
(Review of Neurology) affirmed that “the term prion (Prusiner 1982) is now
used in preference to unconventional agents” (p. 1). The gradual domination
of the prion lexicon can be compared to an infectious disease. Some users are
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Figure 1: Use of the Term “Prion” between 1982 and 1992
NOTE: Exposed, carriers = those who employ prion terms but are skeptical of prion causal theory; exposed, uninfected = disagree with prion hypothesis and avoid prion language; exposed,
infected = agree with prion theory and employ prion terminology (Prusiner not author).

what I call “exposed, infected”—those who agree with Prusiner and employ
the lexicon almost as aggressively as did the Prusiner laboratory. Some
users are “exposed carriers” who remain uncertain or skeptical but employ
the prion terminology, thus becoming carriers of the prion idea. Some
users are “exposed, uninfected” who disagree with the prion idea and avoid
using the prion lexicon. From examining papers on scrapie and transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies, I have grouped papers according to whether
they employ prion terms and whether they indicate agreement with the prion
hypothesis. In Figure 1, we can see a gradual increase in usage of the prion
lexicon, with those who agree with the hypothesis and use the term and those
who remain skeptical but use the term outnumbering those who reject prion
terms. Thus, by 1992, approximately two-thirds of the articles on scrapie or
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies employed the prion lexicon.
The popular momentum Professor Manuelidis (2000) referred to could
have resulted from sheer repetition of prion terms in papers authored by those
exposed carriers who remained undecided about or disagreed with the prion
hypothesis. For example, Holland (1988) employed the prion lexicon
although he apparently continued to think of the agent as virus-like:
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the modes of transmission of the prion of CJD are not known for the majority of
cases. However, the viruslike particle has apparently been transmitted through
the use of human tissues, such as dura mater. . . . The prion appears to be
extremely resistant to inactivation. (P. 293)

So use of the prion lexicon is not hindered by lack of agreement with the
hypothesis or by lack of knowledge about its very un-virus-like nature.
Some exposed carriers are uninfected, disagreeing with Prusiner but
adhering to a fairness principle that leads to the reciting of all competing terminology. Race et al. (1988), who disagree with Prusiner, listed the different
terms that have been offered for the infectious particle and for the host protein
necessary for its infectivity:
the only macromolecular structures consistently detected in partially purified
preparations from brains of infected animals are fibrils known as scrapieassociated fibrils (9, 17) or prion rods (22) which consist primarily of a proteinase K (PK)–resistant protein called prion protein (PrP) (3, 11, 16 or scrapieassociated fibril protein (9, 11). (P. 2845)

Other authors link the prion with its competition, scrapie-associated fibrils:
The prion protein (PrP) is a scrapie-associated fibril protein that accumulates
in the brains of hamsters and mice infected with the scrapie agent. (Locht et al.
1986, 6372)
Polyclonal antibodies to purified scrapie-associated fibril/prion protein . . .
extracted from scrapie-infected hamster brains. (Guiroy et al. 1989, 102)

Other detractors use modals to qualify and lend an aura of doubt surrounding
the prion hypothesis, yet they nonetheless employ the prion lexicon. Aiken
et al. (1990), for example, stated:
the prion preparation has, in recent years, been the focal point of scrapie
research. The inability to identify agent-specific nucleic acids in this sample has led to the formulation of the infectious protein or prion hypothesis.
(P. 3265)

Including the main evidence for a protein-only agent and calling the hypothesis a formulation does detract from fact-like status, but the term “prion”
retains its dominion as no other term for the agent is provided.
Other authors attempt to stave off the ultimate dominion of the prion lexicon by placing quotation marks around the term, as in “prion” (see
Manuelidis, Sklaviadis, and Manuelidis 1987), to signal an arbitrary terminological choice. Or they employ the expression “generally referred to as
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prion protein (PrP)” (Caughey et al. 1990, 1093), which serves to signal the
popularity rather than authority of the term.
A few authors or research teams avoid the prion lexicon. Instead of
“prion,” they employ “scrapie-associated fibrils” (Kimberlin 1986, 1989);
instead of “prion protein,” they employ the term “Scrapie-associated fibril
protein” (Kascsak et al. 1987) or “scrapie agent protease-resistant protein”
(Bendheim and Bolton 1986); instead of “prion protein gene,” they employ
“scrapie-associated fibril protein gene” (Hunter et al. 1987).
Scores of articles not produced in the Prusiner laboratory were published
in the 1980s and in 1990 and include prionic terms in titles and/or abstracts.
The repetition of key terms in titles and abstracts helps to promote those
terms. Such repetition occurs in papers from Prusiner’s opposition as well as
his allies. Prionic terms may be used by detractors to criticize the prion
hypothesis, by those who are uncertain whether they agree with the original
prion hypothesis but who are working the protein or the gene, and by those
who agree with Prusiner.

Testimony
Usage promoted the protein orientation even when language users did not
actually agree with—or understand—the implications of those terms. In
1998, a year after Prusiner won the Nobel Prize, Bruce Chesebro argued in a
Science editorial that the nature of prions remains a mystery:
the fact remains that there are no definitive data on the nature of prions. Prions
continue to be vaguely defined, and for the most part this term is used as an
operational term for the transmissible agent, but without structural implications. (P. 42)

In e-mail correspondence with me, Chesebro (6 October 1998) explained:
the repetition of the term “prion” has been so pervasive that even individuals
who do not believe in the prion hypothesis often use the misnomer “prion
gene,” when they really mean “prion protein gene.” Even if one believes in
prions, the term “prion gene” is incorrect and confusing. For if the prion exists
as a protein-only infectious agent, then its most unique property would be the
absence of a nucleic genome, so “prion gene” becomes an oxymoron!

Indeed, several works contain the usage “prion gene,” such as Liao et al.’s
(1986) article, which states, “This human prion gene has been mapped to
human chromosome 20” (p. 364).
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Prusiner’s entire project to attract attention to the prion and to the idea of
an infectious protein—whether or not its mechanisms of reproduction would
ever be identified or entirely understood—ultimately accommodated its
entrance into the “taken for granted basis of the profession’s conceptualization” (Wolpe 1994, 1138). Richard Carp (telephone interview with the
author, 8 June 2000), who was among Prusiner’s earliest critics, claimed that
scientists:
usually don’t realize how language affects the way they think. They see the
word “prion” all over the place and they think, “Well, that’s it, that’s the new
term.” And they use it everywhere, even if they don’t agree with the theory it
carries along with it, and pretty soon, you have a new term and a new dogma.

Carp did not mean to imply that scientists are so gullible that they would
accept a term without question but that they tend to assume that terms are
value neutral, and they may not be aware of more rhetorical uses of terminology. Although he agrees that the protein-only hypothesis still lacks definitive
evidence, “for most people, it’s no longer an issue,” said Carp. Carp said that
prion biology is now so ensconced in graduate education that “there won’t be
any new graduates coming out who will even be asking whether there is a
nucleic acid in this agent, much less have ideas for how to find it.”
For Manuelidis (e-mail correspondence with author, 8 July 1999), the
obvious weaknesses in the protein-only hypothesis have been ignored in
favor of what she feels is the new prion dogma, which has evolved as a result
of “repetition of a term whose assumptions are unassailable because they can
mean more than one thing.”

Conclusion
In 1995, Prusiner dramatically narrated his prion story in Scientific American. The justified skepticism he conceded to early on was in 1995 presented
as dogmatic narrow-mindedness:
I evoked a good deal of skepticism when I proposed that the infectious agents
causing certain degenerative disorders of the central nervous system in animals
and, more rarely, in humans might consist of protein and nothing else. At the
time, the notion was heretical. Dogma held that the conveyers of transmissible
diseases required genetic material, composed of nucleic acid (DNA or RNA),
in order to establish an infection in a host. (P. 48)
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It was no longer necessary to kowtow to the orthodoxy because by 1995, it
seemed, Prusiner was the orthodoxy. Prusiner evoked the classic Galileo legend in which the truth teller must battle intransigent dogma. As we know,
thanks to Thomas M. Lessl (1999), the Galileo legend is a myth serving the
perpetuation of the cultural ideology of science. Prusiner’s evocation of this
legend asserts his power and status, his right to articulate his preferred reading of the history of prion science and of the roles he and his opponents
played in the narrative.
What Taubes called in 1986 a “flair for public relations” (p. 29) is actually
Prusiner’s understanding of the necessity of rhetorical production of a scientific idea. Rhetorical production in this case involved first situating the
hypothesis as heresy within the framework of the orthodox narrative and then
audaciously promoting that heresy. Promoting heresy was accomplished by
diminishing certain constructs within the orthodoxy, such as plausibility, and
emphasizing others, such as possibility. Another aspect of rhetorical production in this case involved situating a new language, sufficiently vague to withstand conservative charges while evoking an idea whose intellectual currency
did, in fact, stimulate productivity in the field.

Notes
1. As Martha Keyes (1999a) pointed out in her history of prion science, Francis Crick’s statement of the central dogma—that transfer of information proceeds from nucleic acid to nucleic
acid or from nucleic acid to protein, but not from protein to nucleic acid—was admitted to be
only a theory by Crick himself, “an idea for which there was no reasonable evidence” (p. 3).
2. See Fahnestock (1986) for an account of how journalists interpret and report scientific
reports.
3. I have compiled a partial list of papers from Prusiner’s laboratory, a partial list of articles
containing prion terminology in titles and/or abstracts whose authors signal disagreement with
the prion hypothesis, a partial list of papers containing prion terminology in titles and/or abstracts whose authors signal neither agreement nor disagreement with the prion hypothesis, and
a partial list of papers containing prion terminology in titles and/or abstracts whose authors signal agreement with Prusiner. Contact me for these partial listings.
4. I am indebted to Martha Keyes’s (1999b, 191) history of prion research for making this
passage known to me.
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